

JOINT U.S. - SOVIET STATEMENT

During their working meeting in the area of Vladivostok on November 23-24, 1974, the President of the USA Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev discussed in detail the question of further limitations of strategic offensive arms.

They reaffirmed the great significance that both the United States and the USSR attach to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. They are convinced that a long-term agreement on this question would be a significant contribution to improving relations between the US and the USSR, to reducing the danger of war and to enhancing world peace. Having noted the value of previous agreements on this question, including the interim agreement of May 26, 1972, they reaffirm the intention to conclude a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, to last through 1985.

As a result of the exchange of views on the substance of such a new agreement, the President of the United States of America and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU concluded that favorable prospects exist for completing the work on this agreement in 1975.

Agreement was reached that further negotiations will be based on the following provisions.

1. The new agreement will incorporate the relevant provisions of the interim agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977.

2. The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985.

3. Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement will include the following limitations:

- A. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed number of strategic delivery vehicles;

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B. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs).

4. The new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980 - 1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985.

5. Negotiations between the delegations of the U.S. and USSR to work out the new agreement incorporating the foregoing points will resume in Geneva in January 1975.

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 7:00 P.M. LOCAL TIME
(4:00 A.M. EST)

NOVEMBER 24, 1974

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Vladivostok, U.S.S.R.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER,
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

4:18 P.M. (U.S.S.R. Time)

MR. NESSEN: Let me have one second before the
Secretary talks to you.

Let me just talk to you for one minute, please. Now,
you have in your hands the Joint Statement. There is going
to be one other longer document which is the Joint
Communique. The Joint Statement is the important document
and it is the one that Secretary Kissinger will talk to
you from. You will get the Joint Communique very shortly, as
soon as we can finish running it off and stapling it and
passing it out.

Both of these statements are for 7:00 p.m., local
time, release. Dr. Kissinger's remarks are also for 7:00 p.m.
local time release.

Now, if you want to take just a moment to look
through it and then Dr. Kissinger will talk to you.

All right. Are we clear now on what is happening?
Both pieces of paper plus the Secretary's remarks are for
release at 7:00 tonight local time.

Q Filing?

MR. NESSEN: We have a lot of events yet to go.
I will tell you about that later.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If you are all through with
reading the Joint Statement, let me deal with that. There
is also a communique which we will distribute and if it
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the Joint Statement, I will talk from it.

The Joint Statement, in our judgment, marks the
breakthrough with the SALT negotiations that we have sought
to achieve in recent years and produces a very strong
possibility of agreement, to be signed in 1975.

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Perhaps the best way to talk about it would be to go back to the history of the negotiations, starting with the summit in July and the conclusion of the discussions since then, in relation to some specific issues before us.

In all of the discussions on SALT, there is the problem of aggregate numbers and then there is the problem of the numbers of weapons with certain special characteristics such as MIRVs. And finally, there is the problem of duration of the agreement.

In July, we were talking about an extension of the interim agreement for a period of two to three years and we attempted to compensate for the inequality of numbers in the interim agreement by negotiating a differential in our favor of missiles with multiple warheads.

This negotiation was making some progress, but it was very difficult to establish a relationship between aggregate numbers. It would be an advantage on aggregate numbers on one side and an advantage in multiple warheads on the other, all the more so as we were talking about a time period between 1974 and at the end of 1979 during which various new programs of both sides were going into production at the precise moment that the agreement would have lapsed. That is to say, the United States was developing the Trident and the B-1, both of which will be deployed in the period after 1979 and the Soviet MIRV development would really not reach its full evolution until the period 1978 to 1979.

In other words, while we were negotiating the 5-year agreement we became extremely conscious of the fact that it would lapse at the moment that both sides would have the greatest concern about the weapons programs of the other. And this was the origin of the 10-year proposal and the negotiation for a 10-year agreement that emerged out of the July summit.

No preparatory work of any significance could be undertaken in July on the summit, so that when President Ford came into office, the preparations for a 10-year agreement started practically from scratch.

Now, in a period of 10 years, the problem of numbers really, for two deployments of a cycle that is usually a 5-year effort. And also, inequalities that might be bearable for either side in a 5-year period would become much more difficult if they were trying over a 10-year period.

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Finally, since we considered that any agreement that we signed with respect to numbers should be the prelude to further negotiations about reduction, it was very important the debates for reduction for both sides represent some equivalence that permitted a reasonable calculation.

I won't repeat on this occasion all the internal deliberations through which we went, the various options that were considered. There were five in number but various combinations of quantitative and qualitative restraints seem possible for the United States.

Finally, prior to my visit to the Soviet Union in October, President Ford decided on a proposal which did not reflect any of the options precisely, but represented an amalgamation of several of the approaches. This we submitted to the Soviet leaders about a week before my visit to the Soviet Union in October and it led to a Soviet counter-proposal which was in the general framework of our proposal, and which I have indicated to you marked a substantial step forward on the road to an agreement.

It was discussed in great detail on the occasion of my visit in October. The Soviet counter-proposal was studied by the President and his advisors and it caused us to submit another refinement, or an answer to the Soviet counter-proposal about a week before we came here. And then, most of the discussions last night, all of the discussions last night, and about two and a half hours this morning, were devoted to the issue of SALT.

President Ford and the General Secretary, in the course of these discussions, agreed that a number of the issues that had been standing in the way of progress should be resolved and that guidelines should be issued to the negotiators in Geneva, who we expect to reconvene in early January.

They agreed that obviously, as the Joint Statement says, the new agreement will cover a period of 10 years, that for the first two years of that period, the provisions of the interim agreement will remain in force, as was foreseen in the interim agreement; that after the lapse of the interim agreement, both sides could have equal numbers of strategic vehicles. And President Ford and Secretary General Brezhnev agreed substantially on

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During the 10-year period of his agreement, they would also have equal numbers of weapons with multiple, independent reentry vehicles and that number is substantially less than the total number of strategic vehicles.

There is no compensation for forward-based systems and no other compensations. In other words, we are talking about equal numbers on both sides for both MIRVs and for strategic delivery vehicles and these numbers have been agreed to and will be discussed with Congressional leaders after the President returns.

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* The negotiations will have to go into the details of verifications of what restraints will be necessary, how one can define and verify missiles which are independently targeted. But we believe that with good will on both sides, it should be possible to conclude a 10-year agreement by the time that the General Secretary visits the United States at the summit and at any rate, we will make a major effort in that direction.

As I said, the negotiations could be difficult and will have many technical complexities but we believe that the target is achievable. If it is achieved, it will mean that a cap has been put on the arms race for a period of 10 years, that this cap is substantially below the capabilities of either side, that the element of insecurity, inherent in an arms race in which both sides are attempting to anticipate not only the actual programs but the capabilities of the other side will be substantially reduced with levels achieved over a 10-year period by agreement.

The negotiations for reductions can take place in a better atmosphere and, therefore, we hope that we will be able to look back to this occasion here as the period or as the turning point that led to putting a cap on the arms race and was the first step to a reduction of arms.

Now, I will be glad to take your questions.

Barry, and then Peter.

Q Mr. Secretary, excuse me, but are bombers under "a"?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

Q Bombers are included. When you say no compensation, you mean what we have in Europe counts against ourselves?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

Q Excuse me?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What I mean is forward bases which are not included in these totals.

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Q They don't count in that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Strategic bombers are included.

Q Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Forward base systems are not included.

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Q My question follows on that. What are the advantages for the Russians in agreeing on the number of MIRVs being equal, that they would not raise questions about compensating for our forward base system.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think that we should ask the General Secretary for an explanation of why he -- I can explain to you our point of view on these matters, but I believe that both sides face this problem.

The arms race has an impetus from at least three sources: One, political tension; second, the strategic plans of each side; and third, the intent of each side to anticipate what the other side might do.

The most volatile of those in a period of exploding technology is the last one.

There is an element that is driving the arms race of insuring one's self against the potentialities of the other side that accelerates it in each passing year. I would suppose that the General Secretary has come to the same conclusion that we have, that whatever level you put for a ceiling it is enough to destroy humanity several times over, so that the actual level of the ceiling is not as decisive as the fact that a ceiling has been put on it and that the element of your self-fulfilling prophecy that is inherent in the arms race is substantially reduced.

I would assume that it was considerations such as these that induced the General Secretary to do this.

Q My question derives from the fact that no bargainer would put himself at a disadvantage and I am just wondering what, from our standpoint, would be the net advantage of maintaining our forward bases without the Soviet complaining that there is some imbalance or some inequality or inequation in the overall purpose.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, as you know, the Soviet Union had maintained that forward base systems should be included in the totals and this was one of the big obstacles to an agreement previously. The progress that has been made in recent months is that the Soviet Union gradually gave up asking for compensation for the forward base systems partly because most of the forward base systems, or I
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attack on the Soviet Union. *Tim*

At any rate, this is an element that has disappeared from the negotiation in recent months.

Q Secretary Kissinger, have you reached agreement on the number of MIRV vehicles or the number of MIRV war-heads?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: The number of MIRVed vehicles. The number of warheads could differ and of course, there are some differentials in the throw weight of individual missiles at any given period, though there is nothing in the agreement that prevents the United States, if it wishes to, from closing the throw weight gap.

We are not going to do it just to do it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when was the discussion of SALT matters concluded and was that time used to discuss any other matter?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The discussion of SALT matters was concluded around 12:30 and all the time between 12:30 and the time I came over here was devoted to other matters. The discussions were practically uninterrupted and I will get into these other matters after we are finished with SALT.

Q I have a question on the delivery vehicles.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

Q You speak of equality which I take to mean some level that is roughly an equality of total U.S. delivery vehicles in a triad mix and the same on the other side.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right.

Q Would this, therefore, involve a larger number of total U.S. vehicles than existed under SALT 1 or by taking in the bombers are you still maintaining roughly the same number of land bases?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: By agreement, we are not giving up the number until the President has had enough opportunity to brief but roughly speaking, the total number is composed of a combination of missiles, of land-based missiles, submarine missiles, bombers and certain other categories of weapons that would have the characteristics of strategic weapons, the total number that accurately is equal and each side, with some constraints, but not very major ones, has essentially the freedom to mix -- that is to say the composite force -- in whatever way it wants. There are some constraints.

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Q Is there any further constraint on the total throw weight that one side or another side could have? Under SALT 1, as I remember, there was a limit on the number of heavy missiles.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The constraints of SALT 1 with respect to the number of heavy missiles are carried over into this agreement.

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Q Up to 1985?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Up to 1985. Throughout the whole period of the agreement. You said there will be a substantial reduction. Is this approximately --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I am saying it will be the objective of the United States now that we have achieved a cap on the arms race. We have achieved a cap on the arms race if we can solve the technical problems of implementing the agreement that was made here. But I believe with good will, that should be possible.

We have always assumed that once we agreed on numbers, we could solve all the other problems, that from the basis of the cap that has been put on the arms race, so that both sides now have a similar starting point it will be the United States objective to bring about a substantial reduction of strategic forces, but there has not yet been an agreement to any reduction, obviously.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is there any provision in here concerning other types of modernization -- improvements, for example, of MIRVs? Was there any limitation on MIRVs discussed?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, there is no such limitation, but this is something that can still be raised in the discussions, but there is no such limitation.

Q Mr. Secretary, what does this initial statement have to do with the Trident and B-1 program, if anything?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Each side has the right to compose -- what it means is that the Trident and the B-1 program had to be kept within the total number of the ceiling that will be established by the agreement, but except for the limitations on heavy missiles, the rest of the composition of the force is up to each side.

Q Are these limits higher than the existing forces of both sides and will both have weapons to reach the --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. By the United States, No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/28 : LOC-HAK-230-2-1-2 weapons you count. For the Soviet Union, it is clearly below the limits and for both sides, it is substantially below their capability.

Q Will either side reduce its arms totals? I was not quite certain of your answer?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would say yes. But I think you will know about that better when the numbers become more --

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Q Dr. Kissinger, would you identify for us what the main hang-up was in the five earlier options and what mix the President decided upon that was the key to advancing an acceptable proposal?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The big hang-up earlier was the combination of time periods and perhaps the complexity of the proposals; that is to say, when you are trying to calculate what advantage in the number of warheads compensates for a certain advantage in the number of launches, you get into an area of very great complexity and when you are dealing with a short, or relatively short time period you face the difficulty that each side throughout this time period will be preparing for what happens during the break-out period.

So, those were the big hang-ups through July. What I believe contributed to this agreement was, first, that with a 10-year program we were able to put to the Soviet Union a scheme that was less volatile than what we had discussed earlier for the reasons of the break-out problem.

Secondly, I believe that one of the problems that was raised yesterday -- namely, that they were dealing with a new President -- may have influenced Soviet decisions because it created a longer political stability.

Thirdly, the discussions, I think it can be safe to say, moved from fairly complex proposals to substantially more simple ones, and this permitted both sides finally to come to an agreement.

Q Mr. Secretary, if the goal at the end of the road is the signing of a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, in terms of percentages how far down that road does this joint statement put us?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Whenever I have given percentages and made predictions, I have got into enormous difficulties. I would say I would stick by my statement earlier. I would say that we are over the worst part of the negotiation if both sides continue to show the same determination to reach an agreement that they did earlier.

The issues that are before us now are essentially technical issues; that is to say, they are issues of verifications, issues of collateral restraints, issues of how you identify certain developments but those are made our original proposals. And therefore, had we not believed that they were soluable, we would not have made the proposals, so we think that it is going to be a very difficult negotiation which could fail. But I think we are well down the road.

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Q Sir, a couple of clarifiers, if I may, that I am not clear on.

Do I understand that there will be a reduction in the number of U.S. MIRVs? And secondly, is there some limit on throw weight? Is that what you are saying or did I hear you wrong?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. There is no restraint on throw weight except the restraint that is produced by the continuation of the ban of the limitation on heavy missiles and there is a restraint on the number of vehicles that can be MIRVed.

What was the first part of the question?

Q Are we past that point where we have to cut back?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, we are not past that point, but we could easily go past that point if we wanted to.

Q I realize that, but we are not physically past that point.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, but don't forget the Soviets have not even begun to MIRV their missiles yet. We are well down the road towards that goal.

Q I realize we have a larger plan at the moment. My question is whether we have to start to subtract.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We do not have to start subtracting.

Q One other clarification question. This aggregate number is yet to be agreed upon?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, that number is agreed upon.

Q It has been agreed upon?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The numbers in both A and B have been agreed upon.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: And the President will discuss them with the congressional leaders but both leaders thought that they did not want to include them in this statement.

Q Well, they would then be included in a treaty?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

Q Ratified?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In other words, the agreement will not fail because of the numbers. The numbers have been set and the definition of what is counted in each number has already been set.

Q Mr. Secretary, what you are saying in effect is that you have already fixed the ceiling but you are not prepared yet to disclose what that ceiling is?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right.

Q And that will be disclosed at what point?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, I would expect during the week and certainly no later than by the time the instructions are drafted for the delegation.

Q Mr. Kissinger, does this not mean -- in other words, will not our MIRV reduction be considerably greater than theirs if we have many more and will not their reduction in nuclear missiles be greater than ours because they are allowed to have more in 1972?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, when you are talking about a 10 year program, I would say within a 10 year program in the absence of an agreement both of these questions are highly theoretical because over a 10 year period both we and they could easily go over the total number of permitted vehicles and easily go over the total number of MIRV vehicles.

In starting from present programs I think it is correct to say that this strain on the Soviet total numbers is going to be greater and the strain on our MIRV numbers is going to be greater but in practice it comes out about the same. In starting from present programs I think it is correct to say that this strain on the Soviet total numbers is going to be greater and the strain on our MIRV numbers is going to be greater but in practice it comes out about the same. In starting from present programs I think it is correct to say that this strain on the Soviet total numbers is going to be greater and the strain on our MIRV numbers is going to be greater but in practice it comes out about the same.

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the numbers of MIRVed vehicles would soon reach a point where even the most exalted military planner would find it difficult to find a target for the many warheads that are going to be developed.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you believe that this will be acceptable to the congressional leaders, particularly those --

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Q Including Senator Jackson?

Q Mr. Secretary, one last question, please. Would you address yourself to the question of good faith on this? This is very important and will be a very important agreement to the security of the people of both nations. What will you say as a statement of faith and a guarantee?

Good faith is involved in not pressing against the legal limits of the agreement in a way that creates again an element of the security that one has attempted to remove by fixing the ceiling or to put it another way by putting a cap on the arms race. But I think that the agreement will be very viable and that the element of good

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the agreement.

The Secretary wants to make this tour.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me take another question.

Q I want to get this right. Do I understand while you are putting a cap on the future numbers this agreed upon total is higher than what each side has now in aggregate, the combination?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I did not say this, no.

Q That is the inference I get.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I said specifically it is lower than what the Soviet has and in our case it depends on how you compose the total number.

Q Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion on what each side will do for resuming the work of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East as soon as possible?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

Q Does that mean the end of your own efforts, for example, in the area?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. This is a phrase that was also in the summit communique and it has always been assumed that my efforts are compatible with the prospective efforts of the Geneva Conference.

Q To what extent did the talks get into the Middle East situation, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was a rather lengthy discussion of the Middle East. Let me go through the topics that were discussed in addition.

There was a discussion of the Middle East, of the European Security Conference and forces in Europe and a number of issues connected with bilateral relations. These were the key other topics that were discussed.

Q Can you tell us about your discussions on the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think there is an agreement by both sides that the situation has elements of danger. that an effort should be made to diffuse it. We agreed that it should be reconvened at an appropriate time and we agree to stay in further touch with each other as to measures that can be taken to alleviate the situation.

Q What role does the Soviet Union think the PLO should play in the negotiations? How should they be recognized and how should they --

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think the Soviet view has been publicly stated. We did not go into the modalities of how they would execute it since we made our position clear at the United Nations last week.

Q Specifically the trade reform bill in the United Nations.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That was touched upon.

Q Where did you leave the ESC?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The European Security Conference. We had a detailed discussion of all the issues before the European Security Conference in which, as you all know, Foreign Minister Gromyko is one of the world's leading experts and we sought for means to move the positions of East and West closer together and we hope that progress can accelerate.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you compare the progress made on nuclear weapons with the progress made by the Soviets with the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not even remotely.

Q You did not make any progress on the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think that progress on the Middle East is for us to make and it was a different order of discussion. The progress on SALT was a major step forward to the solution of a very difficult problem. The discussions on the Middle East I think may have contributed, and we hope will contribute, to a framework of restraint in enabling the two countries that have such a vital interest in the area to stay in touch with each other but it cannot be compared.

Q How much time do you estimate, Mr. Secretary, you spent discussing the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How much time was spent? I didn't keep track of it. An hour, but that is a rough order of --

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
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Q Was there a question of future sale of any U. S. commodities with the Soviet Union?

Q Question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I didn't hear the question either but it dealt with economics so I don't want to answer it.

END (AT 5:01 P.M. U.S.S.R. Time)

For DV

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 24, 1974

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Vladivostok, U.S.S.R.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

1:35 A.M. (U.S.S.R. Time)

MR. NESSEN: Gentlemen, as you can see, the Secretary will brief you on today's meeting.

Let me quickly run through the sequence of events so the Secretary can devote his time to substance.

The first meeting lasted from 6:15 to 8:15 and all the participants who are listed in the briefing that Jack gave you took part in that. There was then a half hour break during which the President and the Secretary took a walk. The meetings resumed at 8:45 and lasted until 11:30.

Q Ron, do you have the walk in the right place? We were just given it in another place.

MR. NESSEN: I will straighten this out after the Secretary. I just want to tell you quickly what the sequence was.

The second meeting lasted from 8:45 to 11:30. The President, the General Secretary, the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister attended that. Then, there was a half hour break from 11:30 until midnight.

The last meeting lasted from midnight until 12:30. The four participants, plus Ambassador Dobrynin, took part in that. The dinner was then postponed. The President walked back to his dacha with his staff and had a snack about which I will tell you later.

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to resume at 10 o'clock until approximately 2 o'clock, at which time the dinner that was canceled tonight will take place at 2 o'clock.

I will give you further details later, but I think at this point you would like to hear about the substance of the meetings from Secretary Kissinger.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can't go into too much substance and as a matter of fact, I am here primarily because I promised some of you on the airplane that I would be here.

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There were two major topics discussed today on the train ride. For about an hour and a half, there was a general review of U.S.-Soviet relations and the world situation. It was a get-acquainted session between the President and the General Secretary. And I think it went very well.

All the rest of the discussions this evening concerned SALT -- that is all of the discussions that Ron Nessen mentioned -- dealt with the subject of SALT.

I think that you remember, as I told you, I believe that progress was made in October. I think that we went further along the road that was charted in October. We went into considerable detail and many aspects of it and we will continue the discussions tomorrow morning. And certainly, enough has already been discussed to give impetus to the negotiations in Geneva.

Now, how much more precise we can be tomorrow, what further details can be developed, that remains to be seen and we will, of course, brief you after the session tomorrow and let you have the results.

We will undoubtedly discuss other issues tomorrow, including the Middle East and Europe, but today, the exclusive focus after the train ride was on SALT.

Barry?

Q Mr. Secretary, did you say that there would be nothing left to discuss because you have already achieved the optimum of what you expected to achieve at this meeting?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, if we had already achieved the optimum that is achievable, there would not be anything left to discuss tomorrow.

We had a very satisfactory talk today. I didn't have any very precise expectations about what we could get. I talked to a number of you and I think I had explained that we will try to build on the discussions of October. That has been done. How much further we can go -- we are really now in areas of considerable technical complexity and relationship of various types of forces to further progress tomorrow morning. In fact, I am reasonably confident that we will.

Helen?

Q Do you know if what has happened today could be called a breakthrough?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I would not call this a breakthrough. The last time I used the word "breakthrough" I suffered from it for months to come.

I think, certainly, enough was discussed today to help the negotiators considerably.

Q Dr. Kissinger, was there a specific proposal that was put forward by one side or the other?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The sequence of events has been as follows: In October, in Moscow, the Soviet Union made a proposal, or advanced considerations, that I considered that we have described as constructive. Building on these considerations, the United States made some counter-proposals which will be before the Soviet leaders when we meet today.

The Soviet leaders, in turn, advanced some considerations of their own to which the President, in turn, responded today, so it is a process in which the views of the two sides are being brought closer without as yet being identical but we are in the same general ball park.

We are talking about the same thing, on the same principles, and each exchange refines the issues more clearly and brings them closer.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you talking about MIRVs? Can you give us any specifics of what area you are talking about?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are talking about comprehensive limitations including numbers as well as MIRVs.

Q Including numbers?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Including overall numbers as well as MIRVs.

Q Do you think now that you have come closer to your goal in 1975 on an agreement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think we have come closer to our goal of having an agreement in 1975.

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as well as MIRVs, you are talking about total delivery systems or are you talking about total warheads or what?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, this is one of the issues that is being discussed, but generally speaking, we are talking about total delivery systems.

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Q Total delivery systems?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

Q What --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Total delivery systems.

Q Has this been one of the subjects of discussion, how to define the number that you then will make known?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, obviously, when you discuss strategic limitations, you discuss what sort of numbers would be considered appropriate as well as how you would then define them and this is part of the discussion.

Q Dr. Kissinger, to follow up, what I asked before, as I understand the events as you described them, the sequence, today, the Soviets came forward with a proposal modifying their views on what we had given them earlier?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Today, the Soviets responded to what we put before them which in turn, was the response to what they had put before us in October. That is correct.

Q And when was it that we gave this response to them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, let's see. I guess on the Tuesday or Wednesday, wherever I had lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin. I guess on Wednesday before we left on the trip.

Q And it was at that lunch?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in connection with this meeting, are you optimistic?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am optimistic about this meeting, yes.

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along? Is there anything you can tell us about your personal view?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have the impression that the two men get along excellently. On the train ride, the atmosphere was friendly and was turning to cordiality towards the end. The subject of strategic arms is not one that lends itself to small talk, but in the breaks, there was an easy relationship and I think both sides are conscious of the responsibility they have in trying to make progress in this area and are conducting themselves accordingly. I think the relationship between the two men is good.

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Q Was the absence of the Watergate ever --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, it is a different atmosphere from the one in July for many reasons.

Q How so?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, in any event, President Nixon was a lame duck President, leaving Watergate aside. President Ford has announced that he is running for re-election in 1976 so he is not a lame duck President.

In July, for a variety of reasons, things were not ripe for an agreement. I think now, I am not saying things are ripe for an agreement here, but I think both sides are making a very serious effort to come to an agreement during 1975.

Q Did you ask President Ford to run to improve his negotiating stance?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Would you repeat that question?

Q Did you urge President Ford to run to improve his negotiating stance?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Did I urge him to run to improve -- that he run?

Oh, did I urge him to run?

Q Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I saw that article. I am not involved in domestic politics and anyone who takes my advice on that is in deep trouble.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you say that the amount of time you spent on SALT today and the canceled dinner indicate that you are behind schedule in terms of your own expectations of the pace of this meeting?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I would say that we have gotten into technical subjects of a complication that might indicate the opposite.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, was this just for relaxation or was it necessary to discuss with the President in private certain decisions or other matters?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: It was to take relaxation in private.

Q Mr. Secretary, considering the decision to go for a 10-year treaty, was a decision by a lame duck President, is it still the way to go about this? Has there been any change in your assessment?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not saying that a lame duck President cannot make correct decisions.

Q I realize that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am saying a lame duck President runs up against the difficulty that his protagonists know the time limit of his term in office and I think that the decision to go for a 10-year agreement was absolutely the correct one, remains the correct one.

Q There were suggestions that it was an option that was not the top option, but it was an option just taking what could be --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. The fact of the matter is that when we analyzed in July, we were talking primarily about a 5-year agreement, five years from now. As we analyzed the difficulties we faced, we came unilaterally to the conclusion that to try to resolve these difficulties would not be worth it because both sides would be straining against the date that the agreement would last and therefore the break-out considerations would almost dominate the agreement itself. So, President Nixon and I came to the conclusion that in any event the effort that would have to be put into negotiating a 5-year agreement and then selling it at home would not really be worth it in terms of its substantive merit and therefore, we did not attempt to narrow the gap by concession here or there which could have kept the project going, but rather, moved it into a framework which seemed on substance more promising.

Q Has the progress been such that some sort of agreement will be signed here, and is there any change in our plans to leave tomorrow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I am certain that we will leave tomorrow. It may be a few hours later

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There is no possibility of signing a SALT agreement here. Whatever is provisionally agreed to here will have to be spelled out in very detailed negotiations which are going to be extremely complicated and which can easily fail. What we can do here is reach orders of magnitude, of directions in which to go, relationship of various categories to each other. That sort of thing can be done here.

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Spelling this out, what it means, what restraints are necessary, what inspection, what requirements there are for this, there is not enough technical expertise here and in any event, it is inconceivable that an agreement will be signed here.

How the guidelines will be given, that remains to be seen after the session tomorrow morning.

Q I take it that the Soviets are willing, however, to go into more detail here than you anticipated. You are saying that the Soviet Government is eager to sign an agreement next year. How much will the chance be improved now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I really would rather wait with making an estimate on that after the session tomorrow. I would think the chances have been somewhat improved.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Is it fair to say that the Soviets were willing to go into more detail here than what you had anticipated?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I thought that there was a possibility that -- we knew the order of magnitude of the discussion because we had reached a point where a specific set of considerations had been put before us. We had replied in somewhat those terms.

We expect the answer to come back again in those terms but the discussion obviously required some detailed analyses. I think that it has gone reasonably well.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you please speculate on what considerations, political or otherwise, may have prompted the Russians to move in this direction and come this far and this much progress?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Don't go overboard yet on progress. I am trying to give you a sense of movement. I have always stressed that this is a very difficult subject and it is quite possible that when we resume tomorrow, it will turn out that we will not go further than where we have reached tonight. I think both sides have realized, and I think the Soviet side has also realized, that at this point we will be so deeply involved on both sides in the process that that cycle will become irreversible. The cycles can really be mastered only at certain strategic intervals and once they have gone a certain time, whatever that particular cycle is, will tend to be completed and one has to wait for the next one to come around.

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I think that realization that we have been stressing for a year, I think it is now accepted by both sides. And it is obvious that if the race continues that the United States will have to enter certain areas of weapons development that it would prefer not to have to do. I think it was a combination of factors like this that has accounted for the progress of the discussions of recent months.

Q Mr. Secretary, you seem to carefully delineate between a provisional agreement and a formal signing. Is there a possibility that by the time you leave here tomorrow evening you might have reached a provisional understanding?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have always believed, and have said so, that out of this meeting some guidelines to the negotiators could emerge, and some guides will certainly emerge. Now, whether they will take the form of announced guidelines or simply a general agreement to instruct the delegation! it is still too early to say.

I don't know what you would call a provisional agreement. There will not be a binding agreement; there will not be an agreement that reflects itself in the actions of the two sides at this meeting.

Q The question then is whether you are going to sign or not going to sign.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That we cannot say until after the meeting tomorrow, but it depends on what you mean by announce. There will certainly be something about SALT in the communique.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you say whether or not the Soviets want to have our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe counted into numbers, strategic weapons?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don't think I should go into all the individual details but when I said that the discussions concerned the relationship of various categories of weapons to each other, that has been one of the questions -- overseas systems has been one of the questions that in the past has been raised.

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about the desirability of trying to work out an agreement that would in fact be more simple than the complex arrangements that have previously been discussed. Are we in fact saying in our response that both we and the Soviets have started moving toward this more simple, more basic formulation?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think it is hard to answer this in the abstract. I think it is probably fair to say that we are moving towards simplicity, yes, but that is a very relative concept.

Q Do you have any limit on the amount of time you will devote to the SALT and how much time are you prepared to spend on the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: These meetings are not clocked and both of the principals are fairly gregarious and easy-going, so you get into a topic and it runs and we are not leaving on a scheduled airliner or from a regular airport. So, we will talk about the Middle East as long as either side has something to say about it. There is no fixed time. We are prepared to discuss it.

Q In that connection, Mr. Secretary, you also said that you would take advantage in the negotiations, of the momentum that has built up. Are you building up the kind of momentum now that would require the benefit from the additional time here? Do you feel pressured -- the fact that we are sitting here at 2 o'clock in the morning -- against some kind of a deadline?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, because we don't have anything that we must finish here. We didn't come here to make an agreement. We are not going to make an agreement here. We have come here principally, as I said before we left, for the two leaders to have an opportunity to get to know each other and to review Soviet-American relations, hopefully to give some impetus to the SALT negotiations. That probably will be achieved.

Beyond that, we have no necessity -- no intention, in fact, to reach any specific agreements because, after all, the two principals are going to meet again for a much more extended summit when the General Secretary visits the United States in the spring.

Q Mr. Secretary, why haven't the two principals met alone, President Ford and Brezhnev?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They will certainly meet alone before the end of the visit here.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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END

(At 2:00 p.m. ...)

me)